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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

INTRODUCTION.
This case involves a dispute between members of a homeowner's association (Kimberley

One Townhouse Owner's Association, Inc.), concerning certain amendments to restrictive
covenants intended to protect the nature of a neighborhood of town houses by prohibiting short
term rentals. The Plaintiff, Virgil Adams, rented his townhouse as a vacation property by the
day or week to persons that were disruptive and violative of the Association rules: e.g., parking
in reserved parking spaces or other areas where parking was restricted, blocking traffic, and
disturbing the peace and quiet enjoyment of other residents of their respective properties.
Plaintiff contends that the amendments were not properly enacted and constitute an
impermissible burden upon his property.
Contrary to Adam's assertion, this is not a case of first impression. This Court has long
upheld and enforced CC&Rs. Under the facts of this case, and Idaho precedent, the members of
the Association were permitted to amend the CC&Rs to restrict short term rentals of lots, and
validly did so. Moreover, such restrictions are facially reasonable in order to maintain the nature
of the neighborhood. Although Appellant complains that the Amendment to the CC&Rs was not
uniform, that assertion is also facially incorrect-the Amendment applies to all lots in the
development. For these reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision and award
costs and fees to the Respondents.

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

Plaintiff/Appellant Virgil Adams (hereinafter, "Adams" or "Appellant") is the

owner of a town-house style condominium located at 1275 East Kimberley Lane in Boise, Idaho.
R. 5, ,I I. He purchased the condominium on or about September 26, 2003. R. 116. Pursuant to
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the Deed, ownership was subject to "conditions, covenants, restrictions, reservations, easements,
rights and rights of way, apparent or ofrecord." Id.
2.

When Mr. Adams purchased his property, it was subject to the original

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for the Kimberley One
Townhouses which had been recorded in August 1980. See R. 6, 14; R. 117, et. seq. ("Original
CC&Rs"). The original CC&R' s addressed the use of property and rentals by stating, "[e]ach Lot
shall be used for single family residential purposes only, on an ownership, rental or lease
basis[.]" R. 119 (Art. III,§ l(a)). The CC&R's could be amended by approval of 90% of the lot
owners. R. 131 (Art. IX, § 3).
3.

The original CC&R's were subsequently amended by more than 90% vote of the

property owners. An Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and
Easements for Kimberley One Townhouses (Amended CC&R) was recorded in September 2007.
R. 6, 15; R. 134, et seq.

4.

The Amended CC&R provided that any future amendments would only require

approval of 2/3 of the lot owners. R. 149 (Art. IX, § 3). The Amended CC&R was approved by
26 of the 28 property owners. R. 159 - 161. Mr. Adams was one of the property owners that
voted in favor of the Amended CC&R. R. 21; R. 159.
5.

In October 2012, Mr. Adams became aware of complaints regarding renters

staying in his condominium. R. 169-70 (KIMB00050-51). This included complaints of renters
taking produce from another owner's garden, excessive noise, and parking issues (including
blocking other owner's vehicles). Id. Adams directed his property manager to address these
issues. Id.
6.

The Board of the Homeowners Association (Board) reviewed the complaints and

approved proposed amendments to the CC&Rs to be presented to the owners. These amendments
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sought to limit short term rentals by requiring leases to last a minimum of six months. A copy of
the minutes of the Board meeting and the proposed Amendments were made available to
property owners, including Adams. R. 186 (KIMB00 171 ); R. 202 (KIMB0023 l ); R. 216-218
(KIMB00l 72-174) (meeting minutes).
7.

On December 5, 2012, David Ricks, a member of the Board, reminded residents

of the proposed amendment and indicated that Board members would be available to discuss the
amendment at the Community's annual holiday get-together. R. 192 (KIMB00183). Adams
acknowledged receiving the email. R. 204 (KIMB00294).
8.

The Board met on December 17, 2012, and discussed the problems and issues

arising from short-term rentals. R. 219-220 (KIMB00339-340) (Board minutes).
9.

On December 19, 2012, Adams sent an email to all other owners regarding the

proposed Amendments, and argued against their adoption. R. 181-183 (KIMB00082-84). Among
other things, Plaintiff pointed out it was more profitable for him to rent his unit as vacation
property rather than renting it as a residence. R. 182 (KIMB00083). He offered to take steps to
prevent the recurrence of problems caused by his short-term guests, including limiting the
number of guests, screening tenants, providing tenant contact information to the Board, and
providing tenants with a set of rules. R. 182 (KIMB0083); R. 221-223 (KIMB00288-290). On
December 20, 2012, Adams became aware of additional complaints regarding his short-term
renters, including threats of vandalism. R. 178-180 (KIMB00079-81).
10.

On December 21, 2012, notice was provided to residents of an annual Association

meeting scheduled for January 29, 2013. The proposed amendment to the CC&Rs was set on the
agenda. R.187-188 (KIMB00178-179); R. 224-225 (KIMB00344-345) (copy of agenda).
11.

On January 4, 2013-months after Plaintiff was made aware of problems with his

overnight rentals-Plaintiff finally offered to provide contact information for his local property
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manager, and again stated he would enforce rules and regulations as to his short-term tenants. R.
175-176, and R. 210 (KIMB00076-77 and KIMB00365).

12.

On January 11, 2013, after the Board communicated its intent to propose the

amendments to the CC&Rs to all property owners for consideration and approval, Adams
responded by threatening to rent his property to college students if short term rentals were
prohibited. R. 173 (KIMB00074). His email to the other lot owners stated:
Please go by my home and take a look at what's there now, and
envision the place with six 18-21 year old boys, all with their own
cars and trucks, holding parties, making noise, and vomiting all
over the common areas at all hours of the night and morning ....
That's what I would do with my unit at Kimberley.

Id. He urged the members object to the Board and stated he intended to sue the Board. R. 208
(KIMB00363).
13.

Adams emailed David Ricks on January 28, 2013, stating his attorney would be

attending the annual meeting. R. 207 (KIMB00346). Ricks responded by reminding Adams the
annual meeting was set for January 29, 2013. R. 206 (KIMB00343). Adams attorney, William L.
Smith, attended the meeting and presented comments on Adams' behalf. See R. 226-230
(KIMB00 190-194).
14.

On February 26, 2013, David Ricks distributed copies of the minutes of the

January 29, 2013, meeting to all the residents. R. 193 (KIMB00184); R. 226-230 (KIMB00190194) (meeting minutes).
15.

The Board met on March 10, 2013, and noted that the proposed amendment had passed,

and that the new CC&Rs would be recorded with the County. R. 231 (KIMB00l 70) (meeting
minutes).
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16.

On March 11, 2013, the Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants,

Conditions, Restrictions & Easements for Kimberley One Townhouses (Second Amended
CC&R) was recorded. R. 6-7, ,I 6; R. 232-262 (copy of Second Amended CC&R).
17.

The Second Amended CC&R was adopted after considerable discussion between

residents, including Plaintiff. See, e.g., R. 177-183 (KIMB00078-84); R. 221-223.
18.

A copy of the recorded Second Amended CC&R was emailed to the residents. R.

185 (KIMB00137).

19.

On June 5, 2013, the Board attempted to set up a time to meet with Adams to

discuss several issues, including the amendment to the CC&R governing short term rentals. R.
215 (KIMB00374). Adams initially refused to meet. R. 184 (KIMB00136); R. 213-214

(KIMB00370-372). However, Adams eventually met with David Ricks. R. 205 (KIMB00342).
20.

The Board received several complaints about Plaintiffs tenants in July 2013. See

R. 196-199 (KIMB00222-225). Unfortunately, when the Board attempted to contact Adams'

property manager, she was unresponsive to inquiries from the HOA president. R. 171-172
(KIMB00053 and KIMB00054).
21.

The Board met on August 20, 2013, and determined that Adams was violating the

CC&R's provisions restricting short term rentals. R. 263-264 (KIMB00176-177). The Board
then enacted "House Rules" creating charges for violating the portion of the CC&Rs governing
rentals. The Board's actions were authorized by Art. 3.1 (k) of the Second Amended CC&Rs. R.
265-267.

22.

On September 5, 2013, the Board's attorney sent a letter to Mr. Adams to notify

him that he was not renting the property in accordance with the CC&Rs, and that his actions
could cause him incur charges authorized by the House Rules to be charged a penalty. See R.
268-270 (KIMB000 1-4).
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II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether Respondents are entitled to an award of their fees and costs on appeal.
III.
RESPONDENTS' REQUEST COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41, Respondents hereby request that they be awarded their
costs and attorney's fees on appeal.
IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

IDAHO LAW PERMITS THE AMENDMENT OF CC&Rs.

The District Court found that the covenants were validly amended to restrict short-term
rentals, that the Amendment was proper and enforceable, and plain on its face. Transcript of
Summary Judgment Hearing ("SJ Transcript"), p. 36, LL 10-11 and p. 40, LL 14-17. Thus,

Appellant was required to comply with the lease and advertising requirements. SJ Transcript, p.
40, LL 17-19. Appellant argues that the District Court misconstrued the word "amend" to allow
changes in the rights or duties under a restrictive covenant, rather than limiting an "amendment"
to the correction of an error.
The District Court's decision was correct. Appellant's argument is without legal basis
and, in any event, been waived by Appellant's prior agreement to change the amending process.

1.

Idaho Law Concerning CC&Rs.

"Restrictive covenants, which restrict the uses to which a party may put his or her
property, are valid and enforceable." Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 43 7
(1996). Accord Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 289 (2000). The
general rules of contract construction apply to covenants. Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144
Idaho 813, 817, 172 P.3d 1088, 1092 (2007). That is, the court must first determine if a covenant
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -6

is ambiguous. Id. "A covenant is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation." Id. However, an ambiguity is not established merely because a party presents
differing interpretations to the court. Id. "If a covenant is unambiguous, the court must apply its
plain meaning as a matter of law." Id. If "a restrictive covenant has been determined to be
ambiguous, the court must determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was
drafted, gathered from the language used and the circumstances which existed at its
formulation." Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). "[B]ecause restrictive
covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes, the
Court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed." Pinehaven Planning
Bd. v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664,667 (2003).

CC&Rs may provide for a method for their amendment. Shawver v. Huckleberry
Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004) (citing 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants §

236 (1995)). See also Nordstrom, supra, 135 Idaho at 348 (upholding amendment to CC&Rs);
Smith v. U.S.R. V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005) (upholding amended

version of CC&Rs over original version as to a height restriction); Best Hill Coalition v. Halko,
LLC, supra, 144 Idaho 813, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007) (upholding amendment that added a density

limitation).
The amendments to the CC&Rs at issue in this case restricted rentals to a six month term.
The District Court ruled the language of the amendment was unambigious and, that the process
utilized to adopt the amendment was appropriate. SJ Transcript, p. 39, L. 19 - p. 40, L. 19.
That ruling is not challenged in appellant's opening brief. Any argument suggesting the method
the Respondent utilized to amend the CC&Rs was legally flawed, or that the language of the
amendment is ambiguous is, at this point, waived. See State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740,
890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995). State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596,601 (1993);
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Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205 - 206, 61 P.3d 551, 562-563

(2001). (The Court "will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply
brief.") Accordingly, unless this Court concludes amendments to CC&Rs must be limited to
edits or non-substantive corrections, the District Court's ruling should be affirmed.
2.

There Is No Support Under Idaho Law For Restricting Amendments to Edits
or Corrections.

Appellant recognizes that CC&Rs may be amended, but contends that an "amendment"
cannot "change" the CC&Rs by adding additional restrictions. Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11.
Rather, Appellant argues that an "amendment" only allows for correction of an error or oversight
in the drafting. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-20. This is not supported by Idaho law on CC&Rs,
or by the cases cited by Appellant.
This Court has upheld significant and substantial amendments to CC&Rs in other cases.
For instance, in Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004), the
developer (Huckleberry) and the Shawvers entered into a contract for the sale of a building lot in
a subdivision. The existing CC&Rs provided certain design restrictions on houses in the
subdivision, including minimum building sizes. Shawver, 140 Idaho at 357-58. The CC&Rs also
contained a provision allowing for th : amendment of the CC&Rs upon written approval of "at
least seventy-five percent of the lot owners." Shawver, 140 Idaho at 358. After purchase of their
lot, the Shawvers submitted floor plans consistent with the building size restrictions. However,
the plans were rejected by Huckleberry, and thereafter, the CC&Rs were amended to change the
minimum building size requirements. Id. It was undisputed the Shawvers' proposed plans did not
comply with the requirements of the amended CC&Rs. Id.
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On appeal, this Court rejected the Shawvers' argument that they were bound only by the
original CC&Rs and not the amended version. See Shawver, 140 Idaho at 361-62. The Court
explained:
This argument is inconsistent with the language of the Sale
Agreement. Under the express terms of the Sale Agreement, the
Shawvers agreed to purchase property governed by restrictive
covenants, which could be amended by written consent of seventyfive percent of the existing lot owners. Such agreements are valid
under the law. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 236 (1995) ("[T]he
restrictive agreements in a tract of land may provide for a method
of abrogating or modifying such agreements, as, for example, by
vote of a certain proportion of the property owners."). The
Shawvers had no right under the Sale Agreement to override the
amendment provision or to avoid compliance in the event
amendments were properly adopted.

Id. The court further observed that "[t]o imply that Huckleberry was obligated to perform the

Sale Agreement subject only to the original recorded CC&Rs would be contrary to the terms of
the contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Shawver, 140 Idaho at 362. See also
Shawver, 140 Idaho at 364-65 (holding that the Shawvers were further bound by a Second

Amended CC&R 1 which had been properly adopted). The court also found that the trial court
erred by not enforcing the amendment to the CC&Rs, because "[t]he district court's order
eliminates the terms of the original recorded CC&Rs with respect to future amendments."
Shawver, 140 Idaho at 365. Accord Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453,

476 (Tenn. 2012) ("When a purchaser buys into such a community, the purchaser buys not only
subject to the express covenants in the declarations, but also subject to the amendment provisions
of the declaration.").

1

The Court's opinion noted that the first amendment to the CC&Rs were invalid because they
had not been properly adopted by a 75% vote. However, a second amendment with the same
restriction was adopted by the requisite vote and recorded after the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment. Shawver, 140 Idaho at 364-65.
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In Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, supra, 144 Idaho 813, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007), a
developer who owned several lots in a subdivision notified the owners that, since it was not
prohibited from subdividing lots by the CC&Rs, it planned on subdividing those lots to create a
35-lot planned unit development. Best Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 815. Certain members of the
subdivision attempted to amend the CC&Rs to add a density restriction requiring at least 2 acres
per lot. Best Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 816. However, they lacked sufficient votes. Id. The
CC&Rs allowed the Homeo\vner's Association to recruit adjoining landowners to join the
subdivision. Best Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 815. After convincing several adjacent landowners
to join the subdivision, the Coalition had sufficient votes to amend the CC&Rs and did so. Best

Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 816. The coalition then filed suit against the developer, in part, to
enjoin the developer from any development of its property greater than the density allowed under
the amendment. Id. Among other arguments, the developer "asserted that the density limitation
was violative of public policy, apparently because restrictions on the use of private property are
disfavored and because the restrictions here were partially imposed by new members to the
subdivision." Best Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 818. On appeal, this Court rejected that
argument, noting the developer had failed to point to any public policy or legal authority that
would prohibit new members of a subdivision from voting on amendments to subdivision
covenants. Id. The Court upheld the amendments and the iajunction entered by the trial court
prohibiting development of property in violation of the density limit.

Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, supra, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003), is also
instructive because in that case, the Court rejected an attempt by a homeowners association to
prohibit vacation rental of homes within the subdivision. The Court noted:
The central issue in this case is whether the Covenants prohibit the
short-term rental of residential property. Three Covenants speak to
the issue. The first, Section 10, provides "[n]o commercial or
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -10

industrial ventures or business of any type may be maintained or
constructed" upon any residential lot. The second, Section 12,
further provides "no more than one (1) single family dwelling may
be constructed" upon any residential lot. A third Covenant, Section
27, provides for interpreting the meaning of certain terms in the
document: "The Uniform Building Code shall be used to define
any term not defined herein." Further, if a term is used that is not
defined in the Covenants or the Uniform Building Code,
"Webster's Dictionary shall be the source used for definition of
terms."
Pinehaven Planning Bd., 138 Idaho at 827-28. The court found that there was no ambiguity, but
that the CC&Rs did not prohibit short term rentals. In reaching its conclusion, the court observed
that the first two provisions cited above were not implicated: the rented house was not
commercial property but was a single family dwelling. Pinehaven Planning Bd., 138 Idaho at
829-30. Moreover, the UBC defined residential use to include "hotels, apartment houses,
dwellings, and lodging houses." Pinehaven Planning Bd., 138 Idaho at 830. Thus, the plain
language of the CC&R did not support the prohibition advanced by the homeowners association.
In short, the Idaho Supreme Court holds that a CC&R is a type of contract and is to be
interpreted according to the principles of contract interpretation. The District Court understood
this. See SJ Transcript, p. 34, LL 10-12. "Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept
underlying the law of contracts and is an essential element of the free enterprise system."
1l'lorrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 Idaho 660, 661, 273 P.3d 1253, 1254 (2012).
From the cases cited above, the Supreme Court has allowed and approved significant changes to
CC&Rs when they were accomplished through the amendment process provided in the CC&Rs
and the provisions are clear and unambiguous. If a declaration contains an amendment provision,
the purchaser buys his or her property subject to the possibility of a later amendment to the
declarations.
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3.

Adams Property Was Subject to the 2013 Amendment.

When Adams purchased his property in 2003, it was subject to CC&Rs. R. 116; R 6,

14.

As the District Court observed, "[i]t's clear that the original CC&R's ran with the property at
issue and that when Mr. Adams purchased the property, he knew that such covenants existed." SJ

Transcript, p. 35, LL 15-18. The original CC&Rs, adopted in 1980 (hereinafter, "the 1980
CC&Rs") included an amendment provision, reading:
The covenants and restrictions of this Declaration shall run with
and bind the land, for a term of thirty (30) years from the date this
Declaration is recorded, after which time they shall be
automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years.
This Declaration may be amended during the first thirty (30) year
period by an instrument signed by not less than ninety percent
(90%) of the Lot Owners, and thereafter by an instrument signed
by not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the Lot Owners.
Any amendment must be recorded in the office of the Ada County
Recorder.

R. 131. Thus, Adams bought his property subject to the Amendment Provision and with the
possibility that the CC&Rs could be amended. Shawver, supra, 140 Idaho at 365. See also SJ

Transcript, p. 41, LL 18-21.
In 2007, the CC&Rs were amended (hereinafter, "the 2007 CC&Rs"). See R. 134 et seq.

One of the provisions changed in the 2007 CC&Rs was the amendment provision, which was
revised to allow future amendments by an approval of only 66-2/3 % of the Lot Owners. R. 149.
Appellant was one of the lot owners that approved the amendment. R. 159. Thus, Adams waived
any objection to the change in the amendment process.
The 1980 CC&Rs included restrictions and regulations on the use, maintenance, and
appearance of property within the development. See R. 119-122, 130-131. Among other
restrictions, the 1980 CC&Rs restricted the use of property:
Each lot shall be used for single family residential purposes only,
on an ownership, rental or lease basis; and for the common social,
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recreational or other reasonable uses normally incident to such use,
and also for such additional uses or purposes as are from time to
time determined appropriate by the Board. . ..
R. 119. In 2013, the forgoing provision was amended to restrict the short-term rental of

properties, to-wit:
Each Lot shall be used for single family residential purposes only,
on an ownership basis; and for the common social, recreational or
other reasonable uses normally incident to such use, and also for
such additional uses or purposes as are from time to time
determined appropriate by the Board[.] Each Lot may be rented to
others for single family residential purposes or otherwise used in a
fashion that in substance amounts to a rental of a Lot . . . only in
strict accordance with the following: (a) A written document shall
be executed between the Lot Owner and the person(s) occupying
the Lot authorizing such Rental Activity (the "Lease"); (b) the
form of the Lease shall have been reviewed and approved in
advance in writing by the Board; (c) any advertising by an Owner
soliciting tenants to enter into a Lease shall be subject to written
approval in advance by the Board; (d) the Board shall not give
approval to any Lease with a duration or term of less than six (6)
months; (e) no Lease shall allow for subleasing; (f) the Owner of
the Lot upon which Rental Activity is being conducted shall
provide and regularly update contact information to the Board; and
(g) the Board shall have the authority in its sole and unfettered
discretion (i) to grant, on a case-by-case basis for reasons of
hardship or for such other reasons as the Board may deem
compelling, a written variance from the requirements of this
Article 3.1.(a) with respect to Rental Activity or Lease of a
particular Lot; or (ii) to adopt, repeal, amend, enact and enforce as
Bylaws or "House Rules" in accordance with Article 3.l(k) such
other and further rules and regulations as the Board in its sole and
unfettered discretion may deem necessary to regulate Rental
Activity for the common good of all of the Owners. Any Lease that
does not conform with the foregoing requirements is subject to
being rendered null and void at the written election of the Board
and the Board is empowered to take any other action it deems
reasonable and necessary to enforce these restrictions on Rental
Activity, including without limitation, seeking injunctive relief in
court.
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R. 235-36. The evidence showed that the Amendment was passed with the approval of the

requisite number of Lot Owners, and Appellant does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the
District Court correctly held that Appellant's property was subject to the 2013 Amendment.
4.

The Plain Meaning of Amendment Includes Making Changes.

Appellant argues that the plain meaning of "amend" does not include "change". This is
incorrect and not even supported by the cases cited by Appellant. The District Court recognized
Appellant's argument for what it was-an irrelevant distraction. The District Court held:
[W]hen Mr. Adams entered into the original agreement as part of
that agreement, it expressly provided for a method of abrogating
and modifying that agreement. I think that the attempt to point to
the language of amend and what does it mean or what's reasonable
is a side issue that's not relevant. It is a red herring, not relevant to
what I'm-what's happened here.
The term amend as used in the original and in the amended
CC&R's should be given a plain ordinary meaning. The Idaho
Supreme Court has allowed the meaning of the word amendment
to effectively mean change.
SJ Transcript, p. 39, L. 20- p. 40, L. 8.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "amend" as: "To improve. To change for the better by

removing defects or faults. To change, correct, revise." Black's Law Diet. 52 (6 th ed. abridged
1990) (emphasis added). Similarly, "amendment" means: "To change or modify for the better. To
alter by modification, deletion, or addition." Id. (emphasis added). As the District Court pointed
out:
Black's Law definition of amend includes words insert or change
the wording of and together with the Shawver case demonstrates
that the additions to Article III were within the power of the lot
owners to vote on and establish.
SJ Transcript, p. 40, LL 8-13.
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Appellant resorts to out-of-state cases to support his argument. He relies on Responsible
Urban Growth Group v. City of Kent, 868 P.2d 861 (Wash. 1994), which he suggests stands for

the proposition that "amendment" does not allow a "change." In Responsible Urban Growth
Group, the city of Kent had annexed an area that included, among other properties, an apartment

complex (Stratford Arms) and a second parcel (the Ward property) owned by a developer (SDM).
Id. at 863. The City's planning department recommended that the newly annexed area be zoned

as single-family residential except for the Stratford Arms and Ward properties, which should be
zoned multifamily. Id. At a subsequent public hearing on the zoning issue, there apparently was
some confusion among the council members as to the proposals before the council, and it
adopted an ordinance (#2771) zoning all but the Stratford Arms parcel as single family
residential. The Ward property, accordingly, was considered single family residential. Id. at 864.
Subsequently, but without prior notice, a new ordinance (#2837) was adopted that zoned the
Ward property as multifamily. This ordinance was characterized as correcting an error with the
original ordinance. See Id. at 866. Under Washington law, adopting or amending a zoning
ordinance required a public hearing and proper notice. Id. at 867. The argument raised by the
parties was whether the word "amendment" in the relevant law included corrections. Id. at 868.
The court, however, held that "[w]e need not reach that question, however, since the record does
not support a conclusion that ordinance 2837 was a correction of ordinance 2771." Id. In support
of its conclusion, the court pointed to the fact that when presenting ordinance 283 7, "the Mayor
presented the motion as one to 'approve Ordinance 2837 amending Ordinance 2771 '." Id. at 868
n. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, "amendment" was clearly viewed by the court to include additions
to covenants. That this is the understanding of the Washington courts is further supported by the
holding in Shafer v. Bd. of Trustees of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 883 P.2d 1387
(Wash. App. 1994), where the court referred to additional CC&R restrictions (restricting the
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parking of vehicles) as "amendments." Id. at 1391 (noting, for instance, that "[t]his amendment
was also passed in accordance with the procedures established in the Articles and the By-laws.").
Harris v. Smith, 250 S.W.3d 804 (Mo. App. 2008) is similarly unavailing to Appellant's

argument. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had misrepresented restrictions on
constructing out-buildings when the plaintiff purchased the property. Harris, 250 S.W.3d at 807.
The original CC&Rs allowed out-buildings, but out-buildings were prohibited under an
amendment to the CC&Rs. Id. at 809. On appeal, the court upheld dismissal of the claims for the
reason that under Missouri law, CC&Rs cannot be amended to add new burdens or restrictions
not found in the original covenants. Id. at 809-810. Thus, the court's decision was based on
Missouri law, not the plain meaning of "amend" or "amendment." Moreover, as even a cursory
review of Idaho case law demonstrates, Idaho allows CC&Rs to be amended to include new
restrictions. See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, supra, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685
(2004); Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, 817, 172 P.3d 1088, 1092 (2007).
As already discussed, in Best Hill Coalition, supra, the court permitted the addition of a
density restriction that had not previously existed. Although Best Hill did not quote the
amendment language of the CC&Rs, it noted that the CC&R's had been the subject of the prior
case of Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 17 P.3d 287 (2000). See Best Hill Coalition, 144
Idaho at 815 n. 1. In Nordstrom, the court noted that the pertinent provision allowed the
covenants to "be altered, amended or deleted in whole or in part, if agreed to in writing by
seventy-five percent (75%) majority of the then parcel owners .... " Nordstrom, 135 Idaho at 347.
Obviously, the density restriction was not the result of a deletion or alteration of a prior
provision, so the change was authorized by an amendment. In fact, the Court in Best Hill refers
to the change as an "amendment." See, e.g., Best Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 819.
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Appellant also cites Boyles v. Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610 (Neb. 1994). There, the
court's decision not permitting new or additional restrictions hinged on the specific wording of
the CC&Rs under consideration. See Id. at 616. The CC&Rs provided that:
[t]hese covenants, water use regulations, restrictions and
conditions shall run with the land and continue until January 1,
1995, after which time they shall be automatically extended for
successive periods of five years, unless an instrument signed by a
majority of the then owners of said land shall have be recoded [sic]
in the office of the County Clerk of Washington County, Nebraska,
agreeing to change same in whole or in part.
Id. (brackets and italics in original). Based on this language, the court held that "the

unambiguous language of this provision authorizes a majority of the lotowners [sic] to make
changes to existing covenants, but the provision does not authorize a majority to add new and
different covenants." Id. That is, the court's decision was based on distinguishing between "these
covenants" and the declarations. Here, though, the Declarations make a clear distinction between
the Declarations as a document, and the covenants and restrictions contained therein; and
specifically allow amendment of the Declarations. R. 131 and 149.
In short, the Appellant's arguments to the contrary, "amend" or "amendment" includes
changes and modifications, including additions. Idaho law allows amendments, including
changes, of CC&Rs. Where CC&Rs clearly prohibit short-term or vacation rentals, courts will
uphold those provisions. See South Ridge Homeowner's Ass'n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758, 759-60
(Utah App. 2010) (upholding restriction on use of property as a timeshare or nightly rental).
Accordingly, the Court should uphold the District Court's decision.
5.

Idaho Does Not Require The Reasonableness Standard.

Appellant cites to Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 633 S.E.2d 78 (N.C.
2006), for the proposition that amendments to CC&Rs must be reasonable. In that case, the
plaintiffs purchased a house in a subdivision which, while governed by CC&Rs, did not mandate
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membership in the homeowner's association (HOA) or provide the collection of dues or
assessments except as to certain electrical utility charges for a lighted sign. Id. at 81-82.
Subsequently, the HOA board adopted by-laws which purported to allow the HOA to assess fees
for the HOA operating expenses, common charges for landscaping and snow removal services,
impose fines, and place liens on property to enforce these assessments. Id. at 82-83. Under North
Carolina law, real covenants may be either restrictive (such as limiting the use of land to a single
family residence) or affirmative (such as paying dues or assessments). Id. at 85. In North
Carolina, "affirmative covenants are unenforceable 'unless the obligation [is] imposed in clear
and unambiguous language which is sufficiently definite to guide the courts in its application."'
Id. (brackets in original). Moreover, "[t]he existence of definite and certain assessment

provisions in a declaration does not imply that subsequent additional assessments were
contemplated by the parties, and courts are 'not inclined' to read covenants into deeds when the
parties have left them out." Id. at 86. Based on the foregoing, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the declaration's inclusion of the right to collect a specific assessment for electrical
utilities did not provide a right to impose general assessments for other amenities. Id. at 87. In
doing so, the Court held that "a provision authorizing a homeowners' association to amend a
declaration of covenants does not permit amendments of unlimited scope; rather, every
amendment must be reasonable in light of the contracting parties' original intent." Id. (italics in
original).
Armstrong is distinguishable for several reasons, not the least of which is that it dealt

with an affirmative covenant (imposition of assessments for amenities and services) while this
case pertains to a restrictive covenant concerning the use of the property. Also, unlike the
covenants in Armstrong, which had specifically omitted assessments for any purpose other than
electrical utilities, the CC&Rs here included limitations on the use of the property; and the
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amendment was merely a further refinement of those limitations to address the problems caused
by Appellant's use of his property as a vacation rental. In fact, the Armstrong court specifically
recognized that "it may be reasonable to restrict the frequency of rentals to prevent rented
property from becoming like a motel." Armstrong, 633 S.E.2d at 88 (underline added). Most
significantly, though, the Armstrong court relied on a "reasonableness" standard which has not
been adopted by Idaho.
As previously discussed, in the Shawver decision, this Court held that the trial court erred
by not enforcing the amendment to the CC&Rs, because "[t]he district court's order eliminates
the terms of the original recorded CC&Rs with respect to future amendments." Shawver, 140
Idaho at 365. The District Court similarly reasoned here:
Restrictive covenants are a contract. Mr. Adams purchased
this property with a knowledge of the covenants and that they
could be changed by a majority of the landowners.
Now, it is unfortunate there is this conflict, but I am also
going to go one step farther and say that to the extent that Mr.
Adams claims that these are not reasonable and they deprive him
of the benefit of his original bargain, I find that's simply not true.
He's still entitled to lease. There are certain restrictions placed on
that entitlement. There is nothing to suggest that those restrictions
are in any way in violation of public policy.
SJ Transcript, p. 41, LL 18-21 and 24-25 -p. 42, LL 1-7.

Other courts have taken the same stance, and concluded that because the amendments to
the CC&Rs are governed by contract principles, "reasonableness" is not a requirement for a valid
amendment. For instance, in Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn.
2012), the court rejected a reasonableness standard, explaining:
Contract law in Tennessee plainly reflects the public policy
allowing competent parties to strike their own bargains. Ellis v.
Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, 280 S.W.3d 806, 814
(Tenn.2009) (citing 21 Steven W. Feldman, Tennessee Practice:
Contract Law & Practice § 1:6, at 17 (2006)); Hafeman v. Protein
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Discovery, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tenn.Ct.App.2011). Courts
do not concern themselves with the wisdom or folly of a contract,
Chapman Drug Co. v. Chapman, 207 Tenn. 502, 516, 341 S.W.2d
392, 398 (1960), and they cannot countenance disregarding
contractual provisions simply because a party later finds the
contract to be unwise or unsatisfactory. Boyd v. Comdata Network,
Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203,223 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002); 28 Samuel Williston
& Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts§ 70:209, at
232 (4th ed.2003).
These contract principles, applied in the context of a private
residential development with covenants that are expressly subject
to amendment without substantive limitation, yield the conclusion
that a homeowner should not be heard to complain when, as
anticipated by the recorded declaration of covenants, the
homeowners' association amends the declaration. See Sterk, 77
B.U. L.Rev. at 282. When a purchaser buys into such a community,
the purchaser buys not only subject to the express covenants in the
declaration, but also subject to the amendment provisions of the
declaration. Sterk, 77 B.U. L.Rev. at 282. And, of course, a
potential homeowner concerned about community association
governance has the option to purchase a home not subject to
association governance. Sterk, 77 B.U. L.Rev. at 301. As one
commentator has noted, people who live in private developments
"are not just opting for private ordering in the form of covenants,
but also are opting for a privatized form of collective decision
making that can undo, replace, modify, or augment the private
ordering already achieved." Fennell, 2004 U. Ill. L.Rev. at 848.
Hughes, 387 S.W.3d at 476 (underline added).

Similarly, in Bryant v. Lake Highlands Development Co. of Texas, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 921
(Tex. App. 1981 ), where the plaintiffs complained that the amendments only impacted a portion
of the lots in a development, the court upheld the amendments because "[h ]aving purchased their
lots subject to the Declarations which included a right of amendment the plaintiffs had no
guaranty that the addition would remain exclusively comprised of townhouses." Bryant, 618
S.W.2d at 923. See also LaBrayere v. LaBrayere, 676 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. App. 1984) ("One
of the burdens [upon the plaintiff's lot] was that the use and occupancy restrictions which
affected plaintiff's lot and the other lots within Briar Wood Manor were subject to change by the
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owners of less than all the lots."); Apple II Condominium Ass'n v. Worth Bank and Trust Co.,
659 N.E.2d 93, 97 (Ill. App. 1995) (rejecting reasonableness standard where the owner had
knowledge that declarations could be amended, and recognizing that self-governing associations
were better equipped to make determinations regarding restrictions).
Even where the reasonableness standard has been applied, its use has been limited to
ensuring that amendments do not destroy the general scheme or plan of development. See. e.g.
Miller v. Miller's Landing, L.L.C., 29 So.3d 228, 235 (Ala. App. 2009); Lakemoor Community
Club, Inc. v. Swanson, 600 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Wash. App. 1979). Thus, as the court in Armstrong

points out, restrictions on the frequency of rentals to maintain a general scheme of single family
residences is reasonable. Armstrong, 633 S.E.2d at 88. Similarly, in Mission Shores Ass'n v.
Pheil, 166 Cal.App.4th 789, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 (2008), the court found that an amendment to

CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30-days to be reasonable. Id., 166 Cal. App.4 th at 796, 83
Cal.Rptr.3d at 113. See also Southeastern Jurisdictional Administrative Council, Inc. v.
Emerson, 603 S.E.2d 366, 371 (N.C. 2009) (holding that amendments to CCR's to charge

service fees was reasonable as a matter of law in light of community's long history of detailed
covenants and providing amenities).
In short, there is no requirement that an amendment must be "reasonable," but even if
there was, restricting the frequency of rentals is reasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, this
Court should affirm the District Court's decision.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO DECLARE THE
CC&Rs AS ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY.

The Appellant argues that the District Court failed to consider its arguments on
discriminatory enforcement. Appellant's Brief, p. 20. However, Appellant does not cite to the
record to support his argument, nor is there any evidence of discriminatory enforcement. This
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Court has previously noted that "even if an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one
of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154
Idaho 425, 450, 299 P.3d 232, 257 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court
should not consider Appellant's argument.
The Appellant also argues that non-uniform amendments require the unanimous consent
of affected property owners, citing a Michigan case, Maata v. Dead River Campers, Inc., 689
N.W.2d 491 (Mich. App. 2004). In that case, the covenants of a subdivision built around a lake
restricted the use of lots to single family residency and incidental recreational use. A majority of
lot owners voted to amend the covenants to exempt one lot from the foregoing restrictions so that
it could be used to provide public access to the lake. Maata, 689 N.W.2d at 492 and 493. The
plaintiffs were homeowners that opposed the amendment. They argued "that because the
restrictive covenants were created and imposed uniformly on the lots they were intended to
protect, property owners who assumed the burden of complying with restrictive covenants were
entitled to receive the corresponding benefit of their neighbors' compliance unless the covenants
stated otherwise." Id. at 493. The court agreed and held that "[n]on-uniform covenant
amendments require the unanimous consent of the affected property owners." Id. at 498.
The Maata holding is irrelevant because Idaho does not follow the uniformity rule. In
Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, supra, 144 Idaho 813, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007), the court upheld

an amendment to CC&Rs that restricted the density of development of lots to one lot per two
acres, but excepted lots being added to the neighborhood that were smaller than two acres. Best
Hill Coalition, 144 Idaho at 816. In other words, all the lots that were originally part of the

platted development (including those that the developer wanted to subdivide) were subject to a
density restriction that did not apply to the lots of new members joining the association.
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Nevertheless, although the developer did not agree to the new restrictions, this Court upheld the
amendment. Id. at 818. In rejecting the argument that the new members should not be allowed to
vote because the density restriction did not apply to their lots, the Court wrote: "The
consideration provided by the newly joining members was that they were to be burdened by the
entirety of the covenants, regardless of whether each individual provision applied in their
particular situation." Id.
Even if this Court were to accept the uniformity rule, it would not require the Court to
invalidate the Amendment. The fundamental flaw with Appellant's non-uniformity argument is
that the Amendment is, in fact, uniform-it applies to all of the lots. See, e.g., LaBrayere v.
LaBrayere, supra, 676 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. App. 1984) (rejecting non-uniformity argument

because the change in restrictions "was done uniformly with respect to all lots within Briar Wood
Manor" and accomplished by the required procedure) (emphasis in original). Citing Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, the court in Brockway v. Harkleroad noted that it was only when

a change to CC&Rs applied to some of the lots (i.e., were non-uniform) that all lot-owners
affected by the change needed to approve the change. Brockway v. Harkeroad, 615 S.E.2d 182,
185 (Ga. App. 2005). "As set forth in the restatement, servitudes in the nature of the declarations
of covenants and restrictions at issue are regularly used to establish uniform schemes of
residential development in common-interest communities, and they commonly contain
provisions for amendment or termination of the declaration without the consent of all the lot
owners." Id. In Montoya v. Barreras, 473 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1970), the court explained the
reasoning behind the uniformity rule, stating:
Historically, restrictive covenants have been used to assure
uniformity of development and use of a residential area to give the
owners of lots within such an area some degree of environmental
stability. To permit individual lots within an area to be relieved of
the burden of such covenants, in the absence of a clear expression
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in the instrument so providing, would destroy the right to rely on
restrictive covenants which has traditionally been upheld by our
law of real property.

Montoya, 473 P.2d at 365.
It is uncontroverted that Appellant is the party that seeks to upset the "uniformity of

development and use" by introducing vacation rentals to the Kimberly One neighborhood. The
Amendment to the CC&Rs retains the uniformity and environmental stability of the
neighborhood by restricting the rental of all lots. The Amendment reads:

Each Lot shall be used for single family residential purposes only,
on an ownership basis; and for the common social, recreational or
other reasonable uses normally incident to such use, and also for
such additional uses or purposes as are from time to time
determined appropriate by the Board[.] Each Lot may be rented to
others for single family residential purposes or otherwise used in a
fashion that in substance amounts to a rental of a Lot . . . only in
strict accordance with the following: (a) A written document shall
be executed between the Lot Owner and the person(s) occupying
the Lot authorizing such Rental Activity (the "Lease"); (b) the
form of the Lease shall have been reviewed and approved in
advance in writing by the Board; (c) any advertising by an Owner
soliciting tenants to enter into a Lease shall be subject to written
approval in advance by the Board; (d) the Board shall not give
approval to any Lease with a duration or term of less than six (6)
months; (e) no Lease shall allow for subleasing; (f) the Owner of
the Lot upon which Rental Activity is being conducted shall
provide and regularly update contact information to the Board; and
(g) the Board shall have the authority in its sole and unfettered
discretion (i) to grant, on a case-by-case basis for reasons of
hardship or for such other reasons as the Board may deem
compelling, a written variance from the requirements of this
Article 3.1.(a) with respect to Rental Activity or Lease of a
particular Lot; or (ii) to adopt, repeal, amend, enact and enforce as
Bylaws or "House Rules" in accordance with Article 3 .1 (k) such
other and further rules and regulations as the Board in its sole and
unfettered discretion may deem necessary to regulate Rental
Activity for the common good of all of the Owners. Any Lease
that does not conform with the foregoing requirements is subject to
being rendered null and void at the written election of the Board
and the Board is empowered to take any other action it deems
reasonable and necessary to enforce these restrictions on Rental
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Activity, including without limitation, seeking injunctive relief in
court.
R. 235-36 (underline added). The Amendment applies to all lots within the development-it does

not single out the Appellant. Thus, even under the uniformity rule, a unanimous vote was not
required.
Finally, Appellant argues that because the Board has the discretion to allow a variance to
the restriction under certain circumstances, it allows the Board to apply the amended CC&R
provisions in a non-uniform manner. Appellant's Complaint is one for declaratory relief. See R.
5 et seq. "[A]s a general rule, a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an

actual or justiciable controversy exists." Nolt v. Cenarrusa, 13 7 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217,
1220 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984)). The
requirement for an actual or justiciable controversy means that the Court will not issue an
opinion advising what the law would be based upon a hypothetical state of facts. Noh, 13 7 Idaho
at 802; ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 331 P.3d 523, 525
(2014).
Appellant's argument here relies on a hypothetical set of facts-i.e., that the Board would
apply the rental restriction "solely as against Appellant, Mr. Adams[.]" Appellant's Brief, p. 20.
There is no evidence offered that the Association's Board has applied the restriction solely
against Mr. Adams while exempting any and all others from the requirements. Neither Mr.
Adams nor any other lot owners have sought exemptions from the requirements. See ABC Agra,

LLC, supra, 331 P.3d at 525-26 (holding that controversy was not ripe because the complaint
was void of any threat, evidence or allegation that the property would be developed in violation
of the CC&Rs). It does not follow from the fact that Mr. Adams' rental activity prompted the
Amendment that the Association will only enforce the restrictions against Mr. Adams. Obviously,
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the concerns about security, noise, parking, and so on, would apply to any other lot being used as
a vacation rental or hotel. In short, Mr. Adams is asking this Court to opine on a set of
hypothetical facts, which this Court has said it will not do. Accordingly, the Court should reject
Appellant's arguments, and uphold the determination of the District Court.
C.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS APPROPRIATE.

In its final argument, concerning attorney's fees, Appellant simultaneously argues that the
District Court erred in awarding fees to the Association per the CC&Rs, while arguing that he is
entitled to an award of fees on appeal and below "aris[ing] from the fee provisions of the
CC&R's[.]" See Appellant's Brief, pp. 24 and 25.
Rule 54 provides that "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees
... to the prevailing party ... when provided for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
"Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action and
processed in the same manner as costs and included in the memorandum of costs[.]" I.R.C.P.
54(e)(S). Appellant does not challenge the reasonableness of the fees, but only whether the fees

could be awarded under a contract.
The Second Amended CC&Rs allow the Association or any Owner to enforce the
covenants via a lawsuit. The CC&Rs also provide that "[i]n the event suit is brought to enforce
the covenants contained herein, the prevailing party shall be entitled to be awarded his
reasonable attorneys fees in addition to allowed costs." R. 248 (Art. 9 § 1). Identical language
was used in the earlier versions of the CC&Rs. See R. 131 (Original CC&Rs); R. 148 (Amended
CC&Rs).
Although he now argues that his action had nothing to do with enforcement, A lams'
Complaint alleged "this is a current and existing controversy as to the validity and enforceability
of the second amended restrictions as to the use of Adams' real property." See R. 7
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-26

(1 7)

(emphasis added). The allegations in the Complaint describe a controversy surrounding the
enforcement of the CC&Rs. See R. 60-61 (Exhibit D. to the Complaint-a demand letter from
Kimberly One seeking Adams' compliance with the Amendment). Through his suit, Appellant
was seeking to enforce the earlier versions of the CC&Rs that did not restrict short term rentals.
Moreover, at ifl 9 of his Complaint, Appellant sought mandatory attorney's fees pursuant to
Article IX,§ I of the CC&Rs. See R. 9 (if 19).
The District Court recognized these facts in its decision on the matter. The District Court
explained:
I find that the - that this is covered by the homeowner's
association agreement and that it is a contract. We have plenty of
case law that says that it is. And that we-in looking at the plain
language, what we see is that the parties by agreeing to the
homeowner's association agreement have agreed to pay the fees of
the prevailing party in any action that involves the enforcement of
those provisions.

Clearly that's what was involved here. What the plaintiff, Mr.
Adams, sought was that we invalidate the changes to the
homeowner's association to nullify the attempt on the part of the
homeowners to preclude the rental of his-not just his, but
everyone's, but his particular residence. The result of that would be
that it would be-that provision would be gone, and, therefore, he
would be allowed under the old homeowner's association
agreement to continue the practice of renting.
The logical understanding of the parties-and I would point out
that Mr. Adams himself asked for fees in his original complaint.
The logical understanding of what's occurred is this is the [sic]
enforcement because in determining the validity of the
homeowner's association, in effect it is the enforcement of it.
Transcript of July 3, 2014, Hearing, p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 25.

The District Court's holding is consistent with this Court's decision in Nordstrom v.
Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 17 P.3d 287 (2000). There, the plaintiff (Nordstrom) had previously

brought suit against Guindon for keeping pigs on his property allegedly in violation of CCRs.
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The parties stipulated that Guindon would remove his hogs, pay Nordstrom's attorney's fees and
costs, and Nordstrom would be entitled to judgment if Guindon breached any term of the
settlement. Id., 135 Idaho at 344. After Nordstrom had judgment entered against Guindon, the
CCRs were amended by a supermajority vote of owners to allow the keeping of hogs. Id. When
the district court issued an order to show cause why Guindon should be held in contempt for
failing to abide by the previous judgment, Guindon responded by filing an answer and counterclaim for declaratory relief based on the amendment to the covenants. Id. The district court found
for Guindon on summary judgment, finding that the covenants allowed the keeping of swine.
Nordstrom appealed that ruling. Id., 135 Idaho at 345. After upholding the district court's
determination that the amendment to the CCR was valid, the Court turned to the issue of
attorney's fees on appeal. The CCRs in question provided: "In the event a person whose property
is subject to these covenants is forced to seek litigation to enforce the terms of these covenants,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in addition to other allowable
relief." Id., 135 Idaho at 348. Based on that language, and although the appeal had to do with the
cross-claim for declaratory relief, the Court awarded attorney's fees on appeal to Guindon.
Similarly, in Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155 Idaho
604, 315 P.3d 792 (2013), a case "regarding the interpretation of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions for a subdivision," the Court awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing party based on
the attorney's fees provision of the CC&Rs. See Id., 155 Idaho at 605 and 610. The CC&Rs
provided for attorney's fees for any legal proceeding "for damages or for the enforcement of the
Black Rock Documents or the restraint of violations of the Black Rock Documents[.]" Id., 155
Idaho at 610.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should uphold the District Court's decision as
to attorney's fees.
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D.

THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON APPEAL.

I.A.R. 40 provides that "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing
party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." If the Respondents are found to be
the prevailing party, as they should, they are entitled to costs.
I.A.R. 41 allows for an award of attorney fees. As noted above, the CC&Rs provide that
"[i]n the event suit is brought to enforce the covenants contained herein, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to be awarded his reasonable attorneys fees in addition to allowed costs." R. 248
(Art. 9 § 1). Adams' Complaint alleged "this is a current and existing controversy as to the

validity and enforceability of the second amended restrictions as to the use of Adams' real
property." See R. 7 (i! 7) (emphasis added). Appellant similarly seeks an award of fees "aris[ing]
from the fee provisions of the CC&R's," and thereby acknowledges that the CC&Rs provides for
an award of fees on appeal. See Appellant's Brief, p. 25. Consequently, the Court should award
attorney's fees to the Association on appeal.

V.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Judgment should be affirmed, and
Respondents should be awarded their costs and fees on appeal.
DATED this_}£ day of December, 2014.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

~~-~

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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